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Abstract –When evolutionary games are contested in structured populations, the degree of each
player in the network plays an important role. If they exist, hubs often determine the fate
of the population in remarkable ways. Recent research based on optimal percolation in random
networks has shown, however, that the degree is neither the sole nor the best predictor of influence
in complex networks. Low-degree nodes may also be optimal influencers if they are hierarchically
linked to hubs. Taking this into account leads to the formalism of collective influence in complex
networks, which as we show here, has far-reaching implications for the favorable resolution of
social dilemmas. In particular, there exists an optimal hierarchical depth for the determination
of collective influence that we use to describe the potency of players for passing their strategies,
which depends on the strength of the social dilemma. Interestingly, the degree, which corresponds
to the baseline depth zero, is optimal only when the temptation to defect is small. Our research
reveals that evolutionary success stories are related to spreading processes which are rooted in
favorable hierarchical structures that extend beyond local neighborhoods.
The study of evolutionary games in structured popula-
tions has become a popular theme in statistical physics
research, as evidenced by recent reviews that are devoted
to this fascinating field [1–7]. Especially the evolution of
cooperation in the realm of social dilemmas — when indi-
viduals are torn between what is best for them and what
is best for their society — has received ample attention
[8–23]. It has been shown that phase transitions leading
to favorable evolutionary outcomes depend sensitively on
the structure of the interaction network and the type of
interactions, as well as on the number and type of com-
peting strategies [24–28].
Following the seminal discovery of Nowak and May that
spatial structure can promote the evolution of cooperation
[29] through the mechanism now widely referred to as net-
work reciprocity [30], Santos and Pacheco where the first
to show just how important the structure of the interac-
tion network can be [24]. Players with the largest degree
within the network — the so-called hubs — have the abil-
ity to dominate the evolution, which results in a strongly
augmented network reciprocity in heterogeneous networks
[1,31]. However, this positive effect can be destroyed quite
easily if we take into consideration the realistic fact that
more links with the neighbors also require more efforts to
be maintained [32]. The simplest and most natural way
to incorporate this into the traditional formalism of evolu-
tionary games is to normalize the accumulated payoff by
the number of links each player has. In doing so, hubs
seize to matter, with the ultimate consequence being that
the cooperation level drops to the comparatively low level
that is characteristic for homogeneous networks and lat-
tices [33, 34].
But even if the positive effects of heterogeneous inter-
action networks are washed away by payoff normalization,
a fact remains that our societies are not made up of uni-
form individuals. Rather contrary, inequalities abound,
and not just among humans. We differ significantly not
just in the number of friends and partners [35], but also
in wealth, reputation, and influence that we are able to
exert, to name but a few prominent examples. A very
simple, minimalist way to model this observation is if we
assume that players have unequal potency in passing a
p-1
Szolnoki and Perc
successful strategy to their neighbors during the strategy
imitation process [36]. It has been shown that the diver-
sity of this potency — sometimes referred to also as the
teaching activity — leads to a significantly increased co-
operation level even if degree-normalized payoffs are used.
In particular, if the teaching activity is proportional to
the degree of a player then the originally high cooperation
level that is characteristic for heterogeneous interaction
networks is recovered. In this way social diversity can re-
store the elevated level of cooperation in a much broader
context, and independently of the origin of heterogeneity
or the applied social dilemma [37, 38].
Importantly, social diversity reintroduces the impor-
tance of different levels of influence in the evolutionary
setting, the origin of which has recently been studied in
the realm of social networks [39], and which also manifest
as emergent hierarchical structures in evolutionary games
[14]. In terms of the network perspective of influence, Mo-
rone and Makse have recently introduced the concept of
collective influence [40], which pioneers a more wholesome
take on the problem that goes beyond an individual’s de-
gree and hub status. In a nutshell, many low-degree nodes
can be optimal influencers if they are “surrounded by hier-
archical coronas of hubs”, but they can only be uncovered
through the optimal collective interplay of all the influ-
encers in the network. This arguably has far-reaching im-
plications for a number of important social phenomena,
ranging from efficient immunization [41] to the diffusion
of information [42]. As we will show in what follows, the
collective influence plays an important role also in the evo-
lution of cooperation in social dilemmas, in particular if a
player’s potency to pass its strategy maps to it.
To demonstrate our point, we use the simplified version
of the prisoner’s dilemma game, where the key aspects of
the social dilemma are preserved but its strength is deter-
mined by a single parameter [29]. In particular, mutual
cooperation yields the reward R = 1, mutual defection
leads to punishment P = 0, and the mixed choice gives
the cooperator the sucker’s payoff S = 0 and the defector
the temptation T > 1. We note, however, that the selec-
tion of this widely used and representative parametriza-
tion gives results that remain valid in a broad range of
pairwise social dilemmas, including the snowdrift or the
stag-hunt game.
We consider heterogeneous interaction networks, where
each node is initially designated either as cooperator (C)
or defector (D) with equal probability, and the evolution-
ary process in simulated in accordance with the standard
Monte Carlo simulation procedure comprising the follow-
ing elementary steps. First, according to the random se-
quential update protocol, a randomly selected player x
acquires its payoff Πx by playing the game with all its kx
neighbors. Next, player x randomly chooses one neigh-
bor y, who then also acquires its payoff Πy in the same
way as previously player x. Once both players acquire
their payoffs, we normalize Π˜x = Πx/kx and Π˜y = Πy/ky,
thus taking into account the cost of maintaining the links
and so avoid unrealistically high payoff values. Lastly, if
Π˜y > Π˜x then player x adopts the strategy sy from player
y with the probability
Γ = wy
Π˜y − Π˜x
T · km
, (1)
where km is the largest of kx and ky [24], and 0 < wy ≤ 1
determines the potency of player y to pass its strategy
[36].
Following [40], we determine the collective influence of
a node i as the product of its reduced degree and the total
reduced degree of all j nodes at a hierarchial depth ℓ from
node i, according to
CIℓ(i) = (ki − 1)
∑
d(i,j)=ℓ
(kj − 1) . (2)
In order to use the collective influence to describe the po-
tency of players for passing their strategies, we assume
that
wi =
CIℓ(i)
CIℓ
, (3)
where CIℓ(i) is the collective influence of node i at depth ℓ,
while CIl is its maximum value among all nodes. The ref-
erence case, when the teaching activity is simply propor-
tional to the degree of a node according to wi = ki/kmax,
can be considered as the ℓ = 0 limit of this mapping. We
emphasize that ℓ should be kept beyond a threshold value,
as otherwise one can easily reach the diameter of the net-
work at a fixed system size, as it is pointed out in [40].
For the main results presented below we use two repre-
sentative heterogeneous networks, which are the scale-free
network with the average degree 〈k〉 = 4 and the Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi random network with 〈k〉 = 12 [43]. By using net-
works consisting of N = 2 · 105 players, we are able to
study the collective influence strength up to the ℓ = 5 hi-
erarchical depth. We note that each full Monte Carlo step
(MCS) consists of N elementary steps described above,
which are repeated consecutively, thus giving a chance to
every player to change its strategy once on average. We
determine the fraction of cooperators fC in the stationary
state after a sufficiently long relaxation time lasting up to
106 MCS. To further improve accuracy, the final results are
averaged over 100 independent realizations, including the
generation of the interaction networks and random initial
strategy distributions, for each set of parameter values.
We begin by showing the stationary fraction of cooper-
ators in dependence on the temptation to defect on scale-
free networks in Fig. 1. To illustrate the importance of
diversity, we also show the results obtained with the uni-
form model, where all players have an identical potency to
pass their strategy. In the latter case, due the application
of degree-normalized payoffs, the presence of hubs gives no
advantage to cooperators (as would otherwise be the case
on a scale-free network [24]), and the cooperation level
therefore falls immediately as we go beyond the T = 1
value. When the diversity amongst players is restored, for
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Fig. 1: Fraction of cooperators in dependence on the tempta-
tion to defect T , as obtained on scale-free networks where the
strategy-pass potency of players is determined by their collec-
tive influence (CI). Indexes in the legend mark the hierarchical
depth that was used to determine collective influence according
to Eq. 2. Here 0 denotes the baseline case where CI is simply
the degree of each player. For comparison, the outcome of the
uniform model, where all players have wx = 1 is also shown.
We note that in all cases degree-averaged payoffs were used in
Eq. 1. It can be observed that, depending on the value of T,
different hierarchical depths for determining CI yield the high-
est level of cooperation. For the most adverse conditions CI1
works best, which even at T = 4 enables 50% of the population
to adopt cooperation.
example by making their teaching activity wi proportional
to their degree ki, then fC becomes high and decays only
for large values of T . We refer to this as the baseline case,
which is denoted as CI0 in Fig. 1. Interestingly, the ap-
plication of collective influence to determine the strategy
pass potency can improve the cooperation level further.
Only up to T = 1.5 CI0 provides the highest level of co-
operation and can thus be considered optimal. For all
higher values of T the collective influence, determined at
different hierarchical depths ℓ depending on the value of
T , is a better proxy for the mapping of the potency of
players. For example, at CI1 the majority of the popula-
tion remains in a cooperative state up to T = 4, which is
twice the maximal value of T that is traditionally consid-
ered as the upper limit for the prisoner’s dilemma game.
It can also be observed that, as we increase the hierarchi-
cal depth to determine the collective influence of players
and accordingly their strategy-pass potency, the impact
gradually decreases. For ℓ > 4 we practically recover the
baseline CI0 case.
Results presented in Fig. 2 show that all the rele-
vant features related to the promotion of cooperation,
which we have outlined when considering scale-free net-
works, remain intact also on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random net-
works. Namely, the lowest cooperation level is obtained
when all players are equal in their ability to pass strategies
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Fig. 2: Fraction of cooperators in dependence on the tempta-
tion to defect T , as obtained on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random networks.
As in Fig. 1, here too the strategy-pass potency of players is
determined by their collective influence (CI), and indexes in
the legend mark the hierarchical depth that was used to de-
termine CI. The outcome of the uniform model is also shown.
It can be observed that, largely regardless of the value of T,
the highest level of cooperation is warranted by the CI1 case.
The differences between different values of ℓ are not as well
expressed as when scale-free networks were used, which has to
do with the lower level of heterogeneity that characterizes ran-
dom networks. Nevertheless, the CI0 case and the CI5 case
are hardly distinguishable, marking the progressive worsening
of the conditions for cooperation for ℓ > 1.
onto their neighbors. If the teaching activity wi is propor-
tional to the degree ki (CI0 case), which here introduces
binomially distributed diversity, the level of cooperation
improves. Yet these levels can be improved even further
if instead of simply the degree the collective influence de-
termines the potency of players to pass their strategies.
As in Fig. 1, the first hierarchical depth, yielding the CI1
case, ensures the biggest improvement. Subsequent appli-
cations of deeper levels to determine collective influence
yield progressively worse outcomes, to the point that the
CI0 case and the CI5 case are hardly distinguishable. As
expected, however, the whole effect is less striking here
due to the much more moderate heterogeneity of the in-
teraction network.
To understand these results, in particular why the col-
lective influence proposed by Morone and Makse [40]
yields more favorable outcomes than if simply the degree
would be used as the base for determining the potency of
players for passing their strategies, we explore the distri-
butions of wi obtained for different values of hierarchical
depth ℓ. Figure 3 shows the results obtained for scale-free
networks. The comparison reveals that the largest devia-
tion from the original scale-free distribution is obtained for
ℓ = 1. In this case, the population practically segregates
into two classes, such that there are some influential play-
ers with an intact strategy pass capacity, while the rest
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Fig. 3: Distribution of strategy-pass potency of players, or
teaching activities wi, as obtained for different hierarchical
depths ℓ that were used to determine the collective influence
(CI) on scale-free networks. It can be observed that Eq. 3 maps
the scale-free degree distribution faithfully onto the potency of
players to pass their strategies, and this not only in the base-
line case where CI is simply the degree of each player (which is
naturally expected), but also for all higher depths ℓ that were
used for determining CI. Interestingly, the slope of the power
law distribution drops sharply when going from CI0 to CI1 ,
only to then recover gradually to the baseline case for larger
values of ℓ.
of the population is almost sterile. Conversely, the P (wi)
function turns back to the baseline CI0 case gradually as
we increase ℓ. While the power law property is mostly
preserved, the slope drops sharply when going from CI0
to CI1 . This indicates that the application of collective
influence for determining the teaching activity of players,
in particular at ℓ = 1, significantly lowers the ability of
ordinary, common individuals to pass their strategies. On
the other hand, the most influential players, which have
the highest CI, retain their high wi values.
Qualitatively identical results as shown in Fig. 3 are
also obtained or Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random networks. Based on
the results presented in Fig. 4, it can be observed that,
starting from a binomial distribution at ℓ = 0, the biggest
shift occurs for ℓ = 1, where the average strategy-pass po-
tency decreases with the application of collective influence.
When higher values of ℓ are applied, however, the baseline
distribution is practically completely recovered, much in
the same way as is the stationary fraction of cooperators
in dependence on T depicted in Fig. 2.
The presented distributions of teaching activity empha-
size that those players who have the highest collective in-
fluence are in a very special situation because their po-
tency to spread successful strategies is much better and in
fact more critical than that of all the other players. This is
true even if compared with the distributions that we have
obtained with purely degree-related teaching activities on
scale-free networks. In the latter case, hubs are frequently
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Fig. 4: Distribution of strategy-pass potency of players wi, as
obtained for different hierarchical depths ℓ that were used to
determine the collective influence (CI) on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random
networks. Here again the properties of the binomial degree
distribution of the network are reflected perfectly in the CI0
case, but are qualitatively preserved also for all higher hier-
archical depths that were used to determine CI. As in Fig. 3,
the biggest difference in comparison to the CI0 case can be
observed for ℓ = 1, when the peak of the bimodal distribu-
tion moves significantly to the left, thus indicating that the
majority of players will have a much lower wi. This difference
subsequently disappears more and more for larger values of ℓ.
surrounded by other players who also have a high degree,
and thus a high wi value. Our observations, combined
with those reported by Morone and Makse, can explain
the positive impact of CI-related teaching activities. As
pointed out in [40], players with a high collective influence
can bridge smaller communities that would reside in frag-
mented sub-domains in the lack of influencers. Accord-
ingly, if we remove the nodes having high collective influ-
ence then the whole network would fall to pieces. Since
the strategy-pass potency of players in the smaller, poten-
tially isolated, domains is reduced, this is beneficial for co-
operators. The asymmetric impact of weakened strategy
invasion capabilities was already observed in [45], and it is
based on the simple fact that defectors cannot invade their
neighbors so easily, and hence cannot invade new ground.
Strategies are thus faced with the consequences of their
nature more frequently, which clearly supports network
reciprocity because cooperators enjoy the neighborhood
of akin players. Moreover, slow, coordinated invasions are
always better for cooperators than they are for defectors,
as it was demonstrated directly in [46].
In addition to the fact that the chance of a successful co-
operation invasion is enhanced in smaller domains, there is
another reason why the application of collective influence
is better than the application of degree. Namely, play-
ers who are in “gateway positions” typically still have a
high strategy pass capacity, and hence can exchange infor-
mation between homogeneous smaller clusters efficiently.
p-4
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Fig. 5: Decay of the cooperation level on scale-free networks
when top 2 % of players with the highest potency to pass strat-
egy are sterilized and so made unable to be strategy donors. It
can be observed that the population is most vulnerable when
the strategy-pass potencies of players wi is determined accord-
ing to the collective influence at hierarchial depth ℓ = 1. Im-
portantly, this is also the depth at which cooperation fares best
under the most adverse conditions (see Fig. 1 for details). The
baseline CI0 case and CI5 using the widest neighborhood to
determine collective influence are affected least.
In this way, a mechanism similar to multilevel selection
emerges between homogeneous clusters of different strate-
gies, in that these clusters effectively act as players with
the gatekeepers pushing their strategies on to other clus-
ters.
A straightforward consequence of the presented argu-
ment is that players with a high collective influence play a
key role not only when it comes to effective immunization
or diffusion of information, or other dynamical processes
taking place on complex networks [40, 44], but also when
it comes to the evolution of cooperation in that the out-
come of the entire evolutionary processes is very sensitive
to their state. This point can be easily verified simply by
manipulating the players with the highest collective influ-
ence — for example, by making them sterile. More pre-
cisely, we disable the top 2% of players by denying them
the ability to pass their strategy onto to their neighbors.
For clarity, we restrict ourselves by showing the conse-
quences on the scale-free network only, because there the
difference between the top influencers and commoners is
significantly more striking than on random networks.
In Fig. 5, we show how the cooperation level changes in
dependence on the temptation T due to the sterilization of
the top 2%. When wi is related to ki, which corresponds
to the CI0 case, then blocking the main hubs will not sig-
nificantly lower the cooperation level in the population.
On the one hand, this is because the distribution of wi re-
mains strongly heterogeneous given that only part of the
tail of the scale-free distribution is removed. On the other
hand, players in the neighborhoods of hubs can replace the
role of the latter very effectively. In particular, they can
still transfer the more successful strategy and hence keep
the selection process intact. But when the potency to pass
a strategy is related to the collective influence, then the
population becomes much more vulnerable to the loss of
the top 2%. In the latter case a more obvious decay of
cooperation level can be observed in Fig. 5. There are two
main reasons for this difference. In the first place, block-
ing the main influencers will result in a less heterogeneous
population because all the other players have a signifi-
cantly lower potency to pass strategy (this is illustrated
in Fig. 3). Secondly, and more importantly, sterilizing CI
leaders will block the information flow across the main
gateway positions, and thus hinder the previously intact
emergence of multilevel selection between the smaller do-
mains. While these two factors exist for all ℓ ≥ 0, they
are the most efficient when the depth of influence is ℓ = 1.
We note that the loss of cooperation expectedly becomes
weaker at very high T values because then there is no real
competition between cooperators and defectors.
In summary, we have studied the role of collective influ-
ence in evolutionary social dilemmas, showing that there
exists an optimal hierarchical depth for the determina-
tion of this influence that favors cooperation. While for
low temptations to defect simply the degree, which cor-
responds to depth zero, works fine and is in fact optimal,
for larger temptations collective influence based on depths
one or two is best, depending slightly also on the structure
of the interaction network.
We have shown that the players who have high collec-
tive influence are able to optimally transfer their strate-
gies to others in the population. As Morone and Makse
have pointed out [40], nodes with high collective influ-
ence can bridge smaller communities, and their removal
can cause the whole network to disintegrate. Because we
have used collective influence to describe the potency of
players for passing their strategies, this effectively means
that the potency of players in the smaller domains is re-
duced. In turn, this is beneficial for cooperators because
of the asymmetric impact of weakened strategy invasion
capabilities, which we have observed before in [45]. More
generally, the lessened potency of players in the smaller
domains also slows down the evolutionary process, which
always favors cooperators more than it does defectors, as
we have demonstrated directly in [46].
In addition to the favorable adjustments of strategy in-
vasions, the implications of collective influence spell bene-
fits also at the so-called “gateway positions”, where play-
ers still have a high potency to pass their strategies. We
have argued that this leads to the emergence of multilevel
selection involving smaller homogeneous domains of dif-
ferent strategies. Similar positive effects of spontaneously
induced multilevel selection have been reported before in
the realm of coevolving random networks [47], and con-
ceptually similar effects were also detected in the realm of
evolutionary games on minimally structured populations
[48]. Moreover, such mechanisms can emerge even on reg-
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ular graphs and lattices if the leading players are able to
exchange information directly [49].
Our research highlights the continuation of the fruit-
ful interplay between evolutionary game theory and net-
work science [1, 3]. A decade ago it was discovered that
the diversity of players could have a decisive role for the
successful evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas [9].
Now we know that not merely the local properties, like the
degree of each player, determine the evolutionary success
stories, but that the sensitivity of the spreading process
or the dynamics in the complex interacting network could
also be decisive factors [50, 51]. Accordingly, hierarchical
structures that extend beyond local neighborhoods must
be taken into account.
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